



**British Office
for Somalia**

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From the
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Dear Colleagues,

LONDON CONFERENCE: EMERGING THOUGHTS

The UK believes there is an opportunity right now to tackle the causes of instability in Somalia. We need an international approach focused on actions which support and build on the progress being made on the ground.

For these reasons, we have invited key international partners to a Conference in London on 23 February, hosted by the British Prime Minister. It will discuss how the international community might support progress towards peace and stability in Somalia more effectively, under the leadership of both our African partners and the UN.

Since announcing the Conference, we have held a number of consultations. The emerging messages and some initial conclusions are attached. I also attach a selection of short non-papers which offer some ideas on a range of issues. This is an ambitious agenda. A number of colleagues have suggested the idea of partnerships between two or three of us to drive progress in particular areas, perhaps reporting to the London Conference, but sustaining a leadership role beyond it. I would welcome further ideas or suggestions on this.

In order to discuss these ideas and listen to any reactions or questions you might have about the Conference or these emerging conclusions, I cordially invite you or your representative to a meeting on **Tuesday 10 January 2012 at 1030 at the Serena Hotel**. We would welcome your ideas and thoughts.

Do please let my colleague, Julie Palmer (Julie.Palmer@fco.gov.uk; 020 2844258) know if you or a representative will be able to participate. I look forward to seeing you on 10th January.

In the meantime, my best wishes for the festive season and the New Year.


Matt Baugh
UK Senior Representative for Somalia

NON-PAPER: PROGRESSING SOMALIA'S POLITICAL TRACK: A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD

1. Progress on the political track is essential to move Somalia out of conflict, and towards stable, permanent, representative government. It is also essential to build on the military gains made by AMISOM in Mogadishu, and by the Kenyans in the south of Somalia.
2. The Djibouti Agreement is still the right framework to operate within. The Kampala Accord has sought to resolve some internal tensions and we should continue to support the Roadmap (agreed in September 2011) as a tool to drive forward the key tasks required to end the transition. In this regard we have seen some recent steps forward from the TFIs (e.g. increased commitment to the constitutional process, the establishment of committees under the Roadmap).
3. But progress is still not as quick as necessary. While the Roadmap renewed the agenda for action, it looks unlikely that it will be fully implemented within the specified timelines. This may lead to calls for a further extension of the transitional mandate.
4. Both the Somali people and the international community are disillusioned with the lack of progress: a further extension of the current transition would be unacceptable. The mandate of both the Transitional Federal Government and the Transitional Federal Parliament should end in August 2012, as planned.
5. This paper aims to stimulate debate on what should happen at the end of the transition in August 2012. It does not seek to make firm proposals, but to form the basis for discussion.

National Government

6. Conflict in Somalia will likely end when local resource-based conflict and incentives have been addressed, and effective political structures replace armed militias and unelected appointees. Ultimately, Somalia should have a government and parliament elected by universal suffrage to represent the views of the Somali people. This is unlikely in the short term, so we should consider what steps will move Somalia towards having an agreed constitution and elections in a realistic timeframe.
7. Any arrangements to follow the end of the transition should sit within the framework of the Djibouti agreement. A possible option, drawn from ongoing discussions, is as follows.



8. In this option, in August the parliament could be replaced by a more representative body, which might be a **Constituent Assembly**. This might happen through direct elections at village level in liberated (non Al Shabab-controlled) areas to form electoral colleges which could choose

UK NON-PAPER: PROMOTING LOCAL STABILITY IN SOMALIA

What are we trying to achieve?

Stronger sub-national administrations, trusted by Somalis, with the capacity and incentives to: a) govern peacefully, b) engage in an inclusive national political process to form a stable and effective state, and c) reduce the threats of terrorism and piracy.

How would this be achieved?

The international community would build on existing interventions to help remove the barriers to stabilising these regions, and incentivise constructive engagement in a national political process. Barriers to greater local stability include local conflict over resources, a lack of local capacity, perverse financial interests, and varying levels of legitimacy across existing governance structures. Each region will require a differentiated approach that integrates political, security and development elements.

Components of any approach would include:

Development: strengthening capacity and facilitating representative administrations at all levels; delivering basic services; creating jobs; and maximising the potential of economic assets.

Political: building commitment to Somali-led local and national reconciliation, facilitating political agreements, and establishing agreements for resource management.

Security: strengthening local Somali security and police forces; building community safety and security.

How likely is success?

Evidence suggests a local stability approach can succeed over time, and that sub-national areas of stability can be joined together towards a stable nation-state. Interventions should be based on in-depth understanding of local actors and interests, and establish incentives to participate in inclusive negotiations. For local progress to move towards an effective state via a national political process, coordination across regions will be critical. Access to areas may present a challenge in some cases.

How long will it take?

To be effective the approach will need to demonstrate immediate benefits for local populations. These will need to be reinforced and extended into particularly complex regions over a medium-term timeframe. This incremental approach is probably best suited to the risks associated to Somalia's operational context.

What do we want the London Conference to achieve?

The core group of countries commit to providing integrated support to local stability, in a coordinated manner, against an agreed set of principles.

What could the Conference announce?

- a) An agreement on an international approach for promoting stability at the sub-national level, and a common set of principles for support.
- b) A multi-donor Stability Fund with associated coordination architecture.

What needs to be done to secure agreement at the Conference?

In order to deliver a common vision at the Conference the core group of countries will need to develop a shared understanding of context, aims, and outputs well in advance. To ensure our support is effective and contextually appropriate we will need to agree a set of principles (based on best practice) to guide planning and implementation.

What do we need to resolve?

- a) Explore the best means to coordinate efforts across the international community;
- b) Agree mechanisms for delivery which can respond to scale;
- c) Consider our appetite for risk and how this impacts on which sub-regions we can scale up our efforts;
- d) Develop ideas on how to strengthen the sub-national/national interface and promote national cohesion.

DFID Somalia, 20 December 2011

- It would be useful to have a common set of principles for support.

Some initial conclusions are that in London we should aim at:

- Agreement on an international approach to promoting stability at the sub-national level; a common set of principles for support; and perhaps some agreement on how best to divide our efforts geographically;
- And perhaps a multi-donor Local Stability Fund with associated coordination architecture.

8. International coordination

Key messages include:

- Widespread support for the decision to hold the London Conference
- We should improve international coordination on Somalia policy.
- The International Contact Group, though a valuable occasion to meet those most involved in Somalia, has not found ways to either provide the decision-making leadership we need or capture the range of work we all do on Somali issues.
- We spend too much time in Nairobi and around the world, and not enough inside Somalia.
- We all welcome the announcement that UNPOS will move to Mogadishu.

LONDON CONFERENCE: MAIN MESSAGES AND INITIAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Political Process.

Key messages include:

- It is clear that August 2012 is a key deadline.
- Other parties in Somalia need to be brought into the political process more effectively, to allow for more representative government. The
- Transitional Federal Institutions could be succeeded by some form of Constituent Assembly and Interim Authority.
- Some feel strongly that there needs to be a decisive shift towards supporting some of the regional administrations like Puntland and Galmudug, building on the relative success of Somaliland. Others are equally clear that support for central organs of state remains a key principle.
- All wanted better coordination between international partners on assistance; some suggested a Joint Financial Management Board.

So, some initial conclusions are:

- We should be clear in London that current arrangements come to an end in August;
- That successor arrangements should be more representative and accountable to the Somali people;
- There should be greater transparency of government receipts and expenditure, and between donors/partners;
- That we should aim to coordinate packages of developmental and other support to authorities beyond Mogadishu as part of widening the national political process (more detail on this below);
- And build towards proper national elections in the not-too-distant future.

2. Security

Key messages include:

- The security situation is changing fast. AMISOM in Mogadishu has made significant steps forward; but its funding remains ad hoc and should be put on a more sustainable footing.
- Though Al Shabaab seems on the back foot, it is now moving into a strategy of asymmetric attacks;
- The advances by Kenyan forces to Afmadow were a significant new action, and some are strongly supportive. Many also noted the increasing coherence between Kenyan, Ethiopian, Ugandan and AU military and political strategies, and looked forward to probable UN Security Council discussion in the New Year.

- Many are more cautious about the likelihood of decisive military success; and others wanted greater clarity on the legal position.

Some initial conclusions here are:

- We should try, probably before London, to come to a view on how to put AMISOM onto a more sustainable footing;
- We should look at ways at least some of us can support Kenyan actions, including by stabilisation support to those areas which transfer away from Al Shabaab authority.
- But there are many actors involved; a good outcome from the London Conference would be increased co-ordination of military efforts in Somalia, supported by sustainable funding packages which match our ambition, and a commitment to the long-term development of Somali security forces.

3. Al Shabaab

Key messages include:

- There are diverging views on Al Shabaab, though we detect a common view that there is always going to be a place in Somali politics for those who hold Islamist views, provided they are willing to be non-violent and live in peace with others who hold different views.
- Even those partners who do not wish to deal with Al Shabaab agree that it is important to offer Al Shabaab followers the opportunity to join mainstream politics.

Some initial conclusions are:

- We should try to find a formulation to indicate that an inclusive Somali political process includes space for political Islam;
- We should agree on a common narrative to counter violent extremism in Somalia.

4. Terrorism

Key messages include:

- Our differing views on Al Shabaab are mirrored by differing views on how to tackle terrorism. There are softer and harder-edged versions of this.
- But many agree that greater security and political progress would further undermine terrorism.
- Many feel that we could make some progress in action against terrorist financing.
- Several mentioned the case for an international justice programme in Somalia which would provide a legal structure for the arrest, trial and imprisonment of those found guilty of terrorist acts.
- There has been some suggestion that AMISOM might itself be given a mandate, training and enablers to undertake counter-terrorist operations.

Some initial conclusions:

- The overall message of the London conference should be that we can only tackle terrorist threats through a mixture of political and security progress.
- We should indicate our joint determination to tackle both terrorism and the causes of terrorism and agree stronger international action on terrorist financing;
- And we try to agree some form of Justice Programme to support the development of justice programmes in Somalia and its regions.

5. Piracy

Key messages include:

- Piracy is a symptom of an economic and security crisis, and that it will not be dealt with in isolation.
- Though the media coverage suggests rampant piracy action, in reality more is being achieved than is recognised. Together, our vessels at sea in the Gulf of Aden mean that there are now virtually no piracy incidents there; some would consider taking action from those assets against pirate infrastructure on land.
- Those of us able to place armed guards on our vessels have found that there have been no subsequent successful boardings of vessels.
- A number of countries, especially the Seychelles, have found ways to accept pirates captured by naval forces and try them; and a number of regions of Somalia are now agreeing to imprison those found guilty.
- There are a number of planned events, which could provide very useful opportunities for further discussion, including the planned Kenya Piracy Summit in Nairobi in the New Year and the United Arab Emirates' piracy summit in Abu Dhabi in June.
- And the International Contact Group on Piracy is undertaking a range of work, including on addressing financial flows.

Some initial conclusions are:

- We should work closely with our Kenyan and Emirates colleagues on their meetings, and with those leading the work of the International Contact Group on Piracy and its various Working Groups;
- We should aim to bring to wider attention the good work already being done on interdiction, trial and imprisonment, including specific examples of work we are doing collectively or in smaller group;
- We need to match our work at sea with engagement with the authorities on land, especially regional Somali authorities.

6. Humanitarian

Key messages:

- The situation could well get worse.
- Many in the region are concerned at the cross-border impacts, particularly the large numbers of refugees.
- There is a general desire for better coordination between donors.
- Drought has turned to famine in South Somalia because of conflict, and that preventing future famines will require increasing stability across the south, to enable more investments in poor people's ability to cope with future droughts. The famine is worst in those areas run by Al Shabaab, which undermined their claim to best support people in those areas.
- The UN has the formal lead on coordination, which many have noted, but the OIC is also playing a significant role.
- Turkey and the UN plan a conference in Istanbul later in 2012 which among other issues will look at humanitarian need and better coordination, as well as recovery and reconstruction.
- OCHA launched the UN's annual appeal on 13 December for \$4 billion, to help 4 million people - including 250,000 still suffering famine conditions.

Some initial conclusions are:

- We should work very closely with our Turkish and UN colleagues to ensure London feeds helpfully into Istanbul, including in responding to the OCHA appeal;
- We should aim for language in London which recognises that drought has turned to famine in South Somalia because of conflict;
- We should try to come up with a balanced approach to refugee support which reflects the concerns of the region and our legal commitments under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees;
- We should explore what sort of commitments we can make to providing more livelihoods support, as well as emergency aid, in the worst affected areas;
- And we should look for communiqué language which endorses humanitarian principles based on need and UN leadership on coordination.

7. Local stability

Key messages include:

- Many of us are already providing some support at a sub-national level in Somalia, though there is no agreement between us on who will concentrate where.
- Many of the sub-national regions would like better coordination architecture.
- A multi-donor fund to support local stability could be an efficient way to channel resources and improve coordination.

regional and national leaders. Representation could be from each of the 18 regions of Somalia. Consideration could be given to maintaining the clan balance of representation (the 4.5 formula). Seats could be left vacant for those areas currently controlled by Al Shabaab and unable to send representatives.

9. Alternatively, the accepted clan elders could agree representation (which might be those clan elders) – but this option would risk lack of representation in areas where traditional clan structures are weak.
10. The constituent assembly could then appoint a new **technocratic Interim Authority** for a period of three years, with the task of establishing the institutions of government and preparing for elections. Together we would need to consider how those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo could be discouraged: a possibility would be to bar Interim Authority members from standing for elected office in future. The roles of President and Prime Minister might be combined.
11. The Constituent Assembly could exist for the same limited time as the Interim Authority and focus exclusively on preparing the constitution, including through a process of wide consultation and outreach. At the same time, the **consultative process** bringing together major Somali stakeholders might continue. Once the process of consultation was complete, the constitution could be accepted either by a directly elected and representative body (e.g. a new parliament) or through a national **referendum**.
12. During the period of the Interim Authority, donors and Somali counterparts could exercise oversight of resources through a **Joint Financial Management Board**. An **Anti-Corruption Commission** should be established.
13. By 2015 there could be **elections**, or, in areas where elections cannot be held for security reasons, nominations from the regions to a permanent parliament, if so provided for in the constitution. South Central, if still controlled by Shabaab, could be represented by clan elders. From that process a **government** should be elected, in line with the new constitution.

Local Government

14. The international community should also support the development of government institutions at regional and district level, building on existing structures. The relationship between these structures and national government should be clarified by the constitutional process. At the same time, **regional electoral processes** e.g. in Puntland, should be supported.

